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Note 
 
Guardians of Your Galaxy S7: Encryption 
Backdoors and the First Amendment 
Allen Cook Barr* 
On December 2, 2015, two armed individuals killed four-
teen people in San Bernardino, California.1 In the aftermath of 
the shooting, investigators began looking into evidence they 
could obtain from the shooters’ electronic devices. However, 
when they did so, they were met with a roadblock: encryption.2 
Encryption is everywhere, from toasters3 to televisions.4 En-
cryption is the key to privacy in the digital era;5 it makes secure 
online banking, trading, and purchasing possible.6 The use of 
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suggestions. Additional thanks to Professor Christopher Soper and Professor 
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 1. Adam Nagourney et al., San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14; 
Two Suspects Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html. 
 2. See Pierre Thomas, Feds Challenged by Encrypted Devices of San Ber-
nardino Attackers, ABC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/feds 
-challenged-encrypted-devices-san-bernardino-attackers/story?id=35680875. 
 3. Cf. Chris Orr, Hacking the Internet of Things: Beware of the Toasters, 
TRIPWIRE: THE STATE OF SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.tripwire.com/ 
state-of-security/risk-based-security-for-executives/connecting-security-to-the 
-business/hacking-the-internet-of-things-beware-of-the-toasters (noting that 
hackers may soon target appliances such as toasters). 
 4. See Leo Kelion, Samsung’s Smart TVs Fail To Encrypt Voice Com-
mands, BBC (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31523497. 
 5. See Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4 (1998) [hereinafter 
Privacy in the Digital Age] (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Member, 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, & Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary). 
 6. 1.7 Why Is Cryptography Important?, EMC2, http://www.emc.com/emc 
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encryption, however, comes with law enforcement costs.7 While 
encryption may make it impossible for a criminal to hack your 
bank account, it may also make it impossible for law enforce-
ment to gain access to that criminal’s information, even after a 
court has held that such access is a lawful search and seizure.8 
In response to these issues, law enforcement personnel have 
sought to push technology companies towards implementing 
tools that would allow them to bypass encryption when needed 
as part of an investigation.9 Technology companies on the other 
hand, spurred by the Edward Snowden revelations of 2013,10 
have been very reluctant to comply, fearing the backlash of cus-
tomer reaction they believe would accompany it.11 Thus, rather 
than seeking voluntary assistance from software developers, 
some individuals in law enforcement have begun to push for 
legislation on so-called “encryption backdoors,” tools that would 
provide for government access to encrypted communications.12 
The call for encryption backdoors raises a significant First 
Amendment issue. Originally debated in the mid-to-late 1990s, 
computer source code is arguably First Amendment protected 
speech.13 Indeed, several cases in the 1990s challenged export 
control restrictions on computer source code as unconstitutional 
 
-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/why-is-cryptography-important.htm (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 7. Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Sen. John 
Ashcroft, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 8. Matt Apuzzo et al., Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle with U.S. 
over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to 
-data.html (describing how Apple indicated it could not turn over iMessages 
even after a court ordered it to do so). 
 9. See id. 
 10. Snowden Surveillance Archive, CANADIAN JOURNALISTS FOR FREE EX-
PRESSION, https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-bin/library.cgi (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 11. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 8. 
 12. See, e.g., J. David Goodman, New York City Police Commissioner Says 
Attacks Will Force Changes in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www 
.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/bratton-says-attacks-will-force 
-law-enforcement-to-change-tactics (quoting the New York City police commis-
sioner as saying encryption access was something that “is going to need to be 
debated very quickly”). 
 13. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Software as Speech, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 683, 
691 (1998) (discussing the new problems computer code was creating in the 
First Amendment context in the 1990s). 
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prior restraints on free speech.14 These cases, however, differ 
from modern proposals, which would compel speech by requir-
ing developers to write in encryption backdoors.15 Although 
both courts and commentators have considered whether prior 
restraints like those challenged in the export control cases are 
constitutional, relatively little analysis has been performed on 
when, if ever, compelling software backdoors would satisfy con-
stitutional requirements. 
This Note argues that the broad-sweeping encryption 
backdoor regimes typically suggested by law enforcement per-
sonnel would not satisfy the First Amendment’s prohibition 
against compelled speech. Although there may be some legisla-
tive or judicial actions the government could take to allow ac-
cess to some encrypted communications, requiring changes to 
the source code for all of a company’s devices is not a permissi-
ble response. Part I of this Note provides the technological 
background necessary for a basic understanding of how encryp-
tion software is written and operates. This Part then reviews 
Supreme Court precedent on compelled speech, as well as past 
attempts by the government to regulate or otherwise curtail 
encryption technologies. Part II examines how current pro-
posals for encryption backdoors implicate compelled speech is-
sues in a way that past attempts to regulate encryption did not. 
After distinguishing past attempts from compelled backdoors, 
Part II analyzes the arguments for and against protecting 
source code, arguing that source code may only be compelled in 
the presence of a “clear and present danger,” and that broad 
encryption backdoors fail this test. Given that broad backdoors 
in all devices are impermissible, Part III offers some possible 
solutions that would enable law enforcement to access encrypt-
ed information in narrowly tailored circumstances. Although 
preliminary, Part III provides two examples of how—for specif-
ic individuals—law enforcement could gain access to both 
communications and (in the right circumstances) stored en-
crypted information by working with technology companies. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 
1997). 
 15. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 8. 
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I.  BACKDOOR’S BACKGROUND: TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING ENCRYPTION 
BACKDOORS   
Encryption regulation embraces several distinct areas of 
inquiry: software development, the mathematical mechanics of 
encryption, and First Amendment free speech concerns. This 
Part provides an overview of the technology involved in encryp-
tion backdoors as well as how the courts have addressed regu-
lations of speech similar to encryption backdoors in the past. 
A. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MECHANICS OF 
ENCRYPTION 
A natural starting point for understanding the legal issues 
encryption backdoors implicate is the technology itself. The 
technological components of encryption can broadly be broken 
down into two key areas: the process of creating a computer 
application in general and the mathematical underpinnings 
that make encryption technologies possible. 
1. The Process of Software Development 
Broadly speaking, computer programs are sets of instruc-
tions that tell the various hardware components of a computer 
(processor, random-access memory, display, etc.) to perform a 
particular action.16 Each action is itself miniscule, such as “set 
the pixel located at 917, 229 to color code 7C0019.”17 However, 
the sheer speed with which computers perform individual steps 
brings these steps together to quickly produce end results.18 
Understanding the process of translating computer steps from 
an idea in the programmer’s mind into instructions interpreta-
ble by a computer processor is key to appreciating how encryp-
tion backdoors raise First Amendment concerns. Beginning 
 
 16. See TONY GADDIS, STARTING OUT WITH C++: FROM CONTROL STRUC-
TURES THROUGH OBJECTS 4–6 (7th ed. 2012). 
 17. This would still need to be further broken down into more steps, such 
as determining what amount of red, green, and blue produces color 7C0019. 
See Jeff Tyson, How LCDs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (July 17, 2000), http:// 
electronics.howstuffworks.com/lcd5.htm. 
 18. See, e.g., Intel Core i7-4770K, PCMAG (June 1, 2013), http://www 
.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2419798,00.asp (reviewing a consumer-grade pro-
cessor capable of performing thirty-two operations per clock-tick with a clock 
speed of 3.5 gigahertz). This leads to a total of over one hundred billion opera-
tions per second. 
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with the end result of computer programming—the computer 
application—and working backwards is helpful in this regard.19 
When most individuals use a computer for a particular 
task, they begin by opening the application needed to complete 
that task. On its surface, an application may appear to be a 
single file; however, an application is really a collection of two 
components: machine code (instructions telling the computer 
what to do), and resources or assets (content provided by the 
application developer for the application to use, such as menu 
text and button icons).20 The machine code included with the 
application can be interpreted by a computer processor. Ma-
chine code, however, is very difficult for a human to read or 
modify.21 To aid developers in writing instructions that comput-
ers can understand, tools known as compilers have been devel-
oped.22 Compilers enable developers to write code in a way that 
is meaningful to humans (such as “areaOfRectangle = 
baseLength * sideHeight”) and then have it translated into ma-
chine code for execution by the computer.23 This human reada-
ble code, known as “source code,” is what developers write in to 
express their ideas regarding the steps a computer is to per-
form.24 Free speech issues come to the forefront at this point. As 
content that is meaningful to humans, source code is arguably 
 
 19. The steps a computer takes when running the application are not par-
ticularly relevant to a discussion of how source code should be treated under 
the First Amendment. For a technical discussion of how instructions are given 
to computer processors, see generally JOHN L. HENNESSY & DAVID A. 
PATTERSON, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE apps. A-1–A-54 (5th ed. 2012). 
 20. Glossary, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, https://developer.android.com/guide/ 
appendix/glossary.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 21. Y. DANIEL LIANG, INTRODUCTION TO JAVA PROGRAMMING 7 (10th ed. 
2015). Machine code is literally a string of binary numbers, which are sent as 
high and low-voltage electrical impulses to a computer’s components; those 
components are then hardwired to respond in a particular way. ERIC 
WALKINGSHAW, MACHINE CODE AND HOW THE ASSEMBLER WORKS 6, 8 (Mar. 
8–13, 2013), http://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/~walkiner/cs271-wi13/slides/11 
-MachineCode.pdf. 
 22. LIANG, supra note 21, at 8. 
 23. Id. This is still a massive gloss of how compilers operate. The essential 
point is that compilers convert statements in a language understandable by 
humans to a language understandable by computers. Id. Different program-
ming languages and computer hardware may have more or fewer steps in-
volved in the process of converting human readable code to machine code. See, 
e.g., id. at 16–18 (describing the additional steps Java requires to convert 
source code into machine code). 
 24. GADDIS, supra note 16, at 11. 
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speech or expressive conduct,25 and, therefore, government reg-
ulation of it is generally prohibited by the Constitution.26 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY 
Fundamentally, there is nothing about computer encryp-
tion that could not be accomplished by a human using pencil 
and paper, given enough time.27 Indeed, encryption technology 
dates back to ancient times,28 and computers have merely al-
lowed increased complexity in encryption methods and the abil-
ity of others to intercept and decrypt messages.29 What was 
once difficult or impossible to decrypt may become possible with 
advances in technology.30 As a matter of fact, only one form of 
encryption has been shown to be impossible to break, even giv-
en infinite time and resources, and its use is generally imprac-
ticable for everyday usage.31 For all other forms of encryption, 
the question is not whether the encryption can be broken, but 
how long the decryption process will take.32 
 
 25. This was the main issue of several cases in the 1990s that considered 
the legality of the export bans discussed infra Part I.B.1. See, e.g., Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (considering 
whether export regulation of cryptography suppressed protected expression). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) 
(“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing 
speech . . . or even expressive conduct . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also infra 
Part II.B (discussing the application of the First Amendment to source code). 
 27. Cf. RANDALL MUNROE, WHAT IF? 98 (2014) (“[A] human running 
through computer chip benchmark calculations by hand, using pencil and pa-
per, can carry out the equivalent of one full instruction every minute and a 
half.” (footnote omitted)). 
 28. Chris Savarese & Brian Hart, The Caesar Cipher, TRINITY C., http:// 
www.cs.trincoll.edu/~crypto/historical/caesar.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 29. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 8 (1st ed. 1994). 
 30. Id. at 7. 
 31. Id. at 13–14. That one method is a one-time pad. Its operation is fairly 
simple: given a secret message (in binary form) and a random “pad” of bits as 
long as the message, an XOR operation is performed on each bit of the mes-
sage with each bit of the pad. So long as the pad is truly random and is never 
reused, it cannot be broken. The difficulty in everyday usage is that the two 
communicating parties must find some way to securely exchange their pads. 
RUBY B. LEE, SECURITY BASICS FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS 31 (Mark D. Hill 
ed. 2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hear-
ing on H.R. 695 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 45 (state-
ment of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency) (“If 
all the personal computers in the world—260 million computers—were put to 
work on a single PGP-encrypted message, it would still take an estimated 12 
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Despite being technically breakable, modern encryption 
technologies are still very secure. The encryption program, 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), referenced by the Deputy Director 
of the National Security Agency (NSA) provides an excellent 
example for explaining how modern encryption software 
works.33 PGP is a public-key cryptography system.34 This means 
that sending a secret message with it involves the use of two 
keys: one to encrypt the message (the public key) and a differ-
ent one to decrypt the message (the private key).35 Public and 
private keys can be thought of as keys to a special kind of vault: 
the public key allows any member of the public to put a mes-
sage in the vault (preventing anyone else from reading it), how-
ever, only the private key holder can open the vault and read 
all the messages that have been placed inside it.36 More techni-
cally, the keys used for public-key encryption are a pair of very 
large numbers with particular mathematical properties, such 
that someone with the private key can easily decrypt messages 
encrypted with the public key. Deducing the private key from 
the public key, however, is computationally unfeasible (alt-
hough not theoretically impossible).37 Software developers have 
utilized these properties to write programs that can enable an-
yone to send messages with strong encryption.38 As a result, 
public key encryption software is now widely available to the 
consumer public, provided that people know how to use it. Sim-
ilar tools are also available for encrypting information outside 
of the person-to-person communication context and are used in 
a variety of applications, including inter alia wireless pass-
words, banking access, and computer file systems.39 
 
million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single mes-
sage . . . .”). 
 33. Obviously, the particular encryption scheme used will vary from situa-
tion to situation. Public-key encryption is useful for communications, but is 
unnecessary for data storage, such as information that is kept on a phone or 
computer, but never transmitted. Nevertheless, this public-key encryption ex-
ample highlights the issues germane to the most common situation in which 
encryption problems arise: communications between criminals. 
 34. PGP CORP., AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 14 (June 8, 2004), 
http://download.pgp.com/pdfs/Intro_to_Crypto_040600_F.pdf. 
 35. SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 29. 
 36. See PGP CORP., supra note 34, at 12–13. 
 37. SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 29. 
 38. See, e.g., GPGTOOLS (Sept. 24, 2015), https://gpgtools.org (providing a 
download to easily add PGP encryption to Mac OS X e-mail). 
 39. See, e.g., Milan Broz, LUKS: Linux Unified Key Setup, CRYPTSETUP 
(Sept. 5, 2016), https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/blob/master/README 
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So how does one go about bypassing encryption? Other 
than simply asking the target (or their acquaintances) for the 
password, which is likely to be a nonstarter,40 law enforcement 
typically has four options: keyloggers, backdoors, brute-force 
attacks, and implementation flaws.41 Keyloggers are straight-
forward: they are a piece of either hardware attached to the de-
vice or software running on the device which logs every key 
press.42 The key presses are then either transmitted or the de-
vice eventually removed, and reviewed to find the encryption 
key. Backdoors are similarly conceptually simple, although 
from a public perception standpoint there is disagreement on 
what constitutes a backdoor.43 As used herein (and in general 
by those in the technology industry), a backdoor is any modifi-
cation to the encryption (whether for good, benign, or nefarious 
purposes) intended to enable access to the encrypted infor-
mation by someone that does not have knowledge of the encryp-
tion key.44 Brute-force attacks are simply guessing passwords 
until the correct one is found.45 Given the complexity of pass-
words, however, this typically is not practicable.46 Finally, im-
plementation flaws are flaws inherent in how encryption is im-
plemented, such that even when used correctly, the key can be 
exposed.47 By their very nature, implementation flaws will vary 
from one implementation of encryption to the next.48 
 
.md (last updated June 4, 2016) (describing LUKS, a whole-disk encryption 
program for Linux operating systems). 
 40. Unless the target is granted immunity, compulsion would violate the 
Fifth Amendment. See infra notes 176–83 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Declan McCullagh, Feds Seek New Ways To Bypass Encryption, 
CNET (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.cnet.com/news/feds-seek-new-ways-to 
-bypass-encryption (providing examples of each). 
 42. Spyware.Keylogger, SYMANTEC (Feb. 13, 2007), https://www.symantec 
.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-033116-4256-99&tabid=2. 
 43. See Mario Trujillo, The Slippery Definition of Encryption ‘Back Doors,’ 
THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/269733 
-the-sliding-definition-of-encryption-backdoors. 
 44. See id. 
 45. McCullagh, supra note 41. 
 46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see Michele Mosca, 
Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready? 1, 1 
(2015), https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075.pdf (noting that the advent of quan-
tum computers may make brute forcing current encryption methods possible). 
 47. See McCullagh, supra note 41 (describing when computers decrypt a 
file system, the key is stored in the random access memory, and can potential-
ly be accessed by computer forensics experts). 
 48. For example, in an effort to make Wi-Fi setup easier, the WPS proto-
col allows clients to connect by using an eight-digit pin with particular proper-
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To summarize the technological discussion, there are a 
wide variety of methods by which law enforcement could at-
tempt to access encrypted information. Source code speech is-
sues arise only in the context of backdoors, because only they 
require modification of the written work of a developer or de-
velopers. Nevertheless, such backdoors are attractive, because 
of the limitations of other access methods (one must have ac-
cess to install a keylogger, brute forcing may be computational-
ly impracticable, and an implementation flaw may not exist). 
As a result, seeking to implement backdoors is a natural step 
for law enforcement to take to increase their information-
gathering abilities. 
B. A HISTORY OF ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS AND THE LIMITS 
ON THEM 
In light of public availability of cryptography technology, 
as well as explosion of its usage in modern communications, the 
government has sought to regulate the dissemination of en-
cryption technology.49 Though laws regulating encryption tech-
nology predate modern computer equipment,50 it was not until 
the 1990s that those laws were first challenged under the First 
Amendment.51 Changes in the law in the early 2000s abruptly 
ended this debate,52 at least in the courtroom setting. As a re-
sult, the extent to which limitations on the dissemination of en-
cryption technology source code are permissible is still an open 
 
ties. This dramatically reduces the universe of passwords to a mere 11,000 
possibilities, and as a result of this implementation flaw, brute force attacks 
are possible. Stefan Viehböck, Brute Forcing Wi-Fi Protected Setup, 
WORDPRESS 4, 6 (Dec. 26, 2011), https://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/ 
viehboeck_wps.pdf (describing how the implementation flaw makes brute-force 
attacks possible); Reaver-WPS-Fork-T6x, GITHUB, https://github.com/t6x/ 
reaver-wps-fork-t6x (last updated Sept. 26, 2016) (providing a download for 
software to execute the WPS brute-force attack). 
 49. Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, The Export of Cryptography in the 
20th and the 21st Centuries, in THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION SECURITY 725, 
726–28 (Karl de Leeuw & Jan Bergstra eds., 2007). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Norman Andrew Crain, Bernstein, Karn, and Junger: Constitu-
tional Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 876–84 
(1999) (discussing 1990s challenges to cryptographic regulations under the 
First Amendment). 
 52. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33. At that point in time, 
encryption export was substantially deregulated, mooting challenges to limits 
on exportation. See id. 
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question. This Section introduces both past and present at-
tempts to regulate encryption. 
1. Past Legislative Responses to Encryption 
Software backdoors would not be the government’s first 
foray into the regulation of encryption technologies. Rather, 
since the Second World War (WWII), the government has re-
stricted the exportation of encryption technologies to other 
countries on the basis that they were weapons.53 More recently 
in the early 1990s, Congress attempted to entice companies to 
install hardware backdoors into all their communications prod-
ucts in an effort to gain the ability to easily intercept an elec-
tronic communication.54 
Following WWII, cryptography was primarily a military 
technology.55 As a result, each individual cryptographic device 
required an individual export license.56 This policy continued 
through the end of the Cold War, at which point the NSA began 
approving the exportation of products utilizing encryption keys 
of limited length.57 This loosening of restrictions did little to 
abate business pressure for the ability to export stronger en-
cryption, and, in September of 1999, the government did away 
with most encryption-related export restrictions on retail prod-
ucts.58 
In addition to export controls, in the early 1990s, the gov-
ernment sought to shape domestic use of encryption by propos-
ing a device known as the Clipper Chip.59 Framing the chip’s 
implementation as voluntary, the government pushed compa-
nies to use the Clipper Chip as the means for embedding en-
 
 53. Id. at 728. 
 54. Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html. 
 55. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 728. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 729. Specifically, the NSA permitted keys of up to forty-bit 
length. Id. To put this in perspective, “an increase of one bit doubles the cost to 
the intruder,” id., and today the industry standard for Internet communica-
tions is 2048-bit keys. Liam Tung, Google Strips Chrome, Android Trust for 
Symantec Root Certificate, ZDNET (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/ 
article/google-strips-chrome-android-trust-for-symantec-root-certificate. Thus, 
modern Internet communications are approximately 3*10604 times more diffi-
cult to crack than those that were secured by the Clipper Chip. 
 58. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33. 
 59. Levy, supra note 54. 
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cryption into their products.60 The key, however (pun intended), 
was that, in addition to the chip containing the encryption key 
used by the parties to communicate, each Clipper Chip would 
encrypt each message with a second encryption key, kept by the 
government.61 When authorized by a court order, the govern-
ment could then easily intercept communications between any 
Clipper Chip-equipped devices.62 Unfortunately for the govern-
ment, the Clipper Chip never gained traction.63 A combination 
of exposed security flaws in the chip, as well as the release of 
other tools based on open source encryption, shut down the 
Clipper Chip before it ever gained widespread use.64 
2. Present Attempts To Control Encryption 
After the fall of the Clipper Chip and the end of significant 
export regulation, encryption regulation largely became a non-
issue. Since 2000, encryption usage has greatly proliferated, 
and in 2014, Apple took public-key encryption software and 
made it widely available to iPhone users,65 exactly as described 
above.66 As a result, even Apple became unable to access either 
information stored on the device or messages sent between two 
iMessage users.67 In the wake of this action, the director of the 
FBI began calling for congressional action to require that Apple 
implement a backdoor that would enable government access to 
iPhones upon obtaining a court order.68 
To date, however, no legislation has been introduced which 
would require the implementation of such backdoors. On April 
13, 2016, however, the chair and vice-chair of the Senate Select 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Sean Gallagher, What the Government Should’ve Learned About 
Backdoors from the Clipper Chip, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14, 2015), http:// 
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/12/what-the-government 
-shouldve-learned-about-backdoors-from-the-clipper-chip/. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Bryan Chaffin, FBI Cranky at Apple for Securing iOS, Only Has Itself 
(and NSA) To Blame, MAC OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www 
.macobserver.com/tmo/article/fbi-cranky-at-apple-for-securing-ios-only-has 
-itself-and-nsa-to-blame. 
 66. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 67. Apuzzo et al., supra note 8. 
 68. Ryan J. Reilly & Matt Sledge, FBI Director Calls on Congress To ‘Fix’ 
Phone Encryption by Apple, Google, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2014), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/16/james-comey-phone-encryption_n_ 
5996808.html. 
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Committee on Intelligence did release a piece of draft legisla-
tion, which would require a technology company “that receives 
a court order from a government for information or data [to] (A) 
provide such information or data . . . in an intelligible format; 
or (B) provide such technical assistance as is necessary to ob-
tain such information or data in an intelligible format or to 
achieve the purpose of the court order.”69 This requirement 
would apply to all communications, both foreign and domestic. 
Importantly, however, the act would not “authorize any gov-
ernment officer to require or prohibit any specific design or op-
erating system to be adopted by any covered entity.”70 This lim-
itation would seem to prohibit a law enforcement agency from 
demanding a backdoor. Although companies would be required 
to assist law enforcement when capable of doing so, the law 
would not require companies to change their products across 
the board. In other words, if a company could not (in general) 
hack their own product, the company would not have to change 
the product to make it always hackable, though they would 
have to make every attempt to hack a specific device when pro-
vided the device by law enforcement.71 
In summary, several common strains can be drawn from 
various commentary that distinguish current calls for back-
doors from the Clipper Chip and export controls of the past. 
First, unlike export controls, these backdoors would be applica-
ble even to purely domestic technologies.72 Second, unlike the 
 
 69. Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016, 114th Cong. § 3(a)(1) 
(2016), http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=files.serve&File_id= 
5B990532-CC7F-427F-9942-559E73EB8BFB (discussion draft from Sen. Di-
anne Feinstein, Vice Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence). 
 70. Id. § 3(b). 
 71. Note that this is not the only way to read the bill. Other writers on 
encryption and the law have interpreted the text of the bill as requiring  
backdoors. See, e.g., Joseph Donoso, Anti-Encryption Bill Is an Affront to Pri-
vacy, Technological Security, FREEDOMWORKS (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www 
.freedomworks.org/content/anti-encryption-bill-affront-privacy-technological 
-security; Riana Pfefferkorn, The Burr-Feinstein Crypto Bill Would Gut Our 
Cybersecurity, STAN. LAW. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/04/26/ 
the-burr-feinstein-crypto-bill-would-gut-our-cybersecurity. I do not think this 
mandate is clear from the plain language of the draft, particularly given the 
“no required design or operating system” provision quoted above. I do agree, 
however, that the intent of the bill is likely to require backdoors, and I believe 
a clarification on that point will likely be included in a subsequent draft, 
should there be one. Such a broad mandate would, I argue infra, be incon-
sistent with the First Amendment. See infra Part II.C. 
 72. See Conor Friedersdorf, Is Law Enforcement Crying Wolf About the 
Dangers of Locked Phones?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www 
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Clipper Chip, including such functionality would not be option-
al.73 Third, also unlike the Clipper Chip, a modern backdoor 
would involve changes to developers’ written product, rather 
than merely adding additional hardware.74 As discussed below, 
it is this third difference in particular that raises many of the 
constitutional issues. 
C. FREE SPEECH ISSUES OF FORCING SOFTWARE CHANGES 
Software backdoors are not the first instance of encryption 
regulations potentially running afoul of the First Amendment. 
Rather, in the mid-1990s, both courts and commentators began 
considering to what extent the government could regulate the 
dissemination of source code.75 At that point in time, however, 
the focus was largely on prior restraints of speech, whereas this 
Note focuses on limitations of compelled speech. This Section 
reviews this discussion to the extent it bears on present day 
calls for backdoors. 
1. Doctrinal Limitations on Compelling Speech 
When discussing First Amendment protection of speech, a 
common perspective among commentators is to consider 
whether the government is placing limitations on what can be 
said.76 Indeed, the relevant text of the amendment—“Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”77—
facially suggests only that Congress may not abridge speech, 
but provides no explicit prohibition against Congress compel-
ling speech. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected this 
literal interpretation of the First Amendment78 and has recog-
 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/is-law-enforcement-crying-wolf-about 
-the-dangers-of-locked-phones/470055. 
 73. See Reilly & Sledge, supra note 68. 
 74. See Laura Wagner, Apple CEO Tim Cook: Backdoor to iPhones Would 
Be Software Equivalent of Cancer, NPR (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/24/468016377/apple-ceo-tim-cook-back-door-to 
-iphones-would-be-software-equivalent-of-cancer (quoting Apple’s CEO as say-
ing the only way to implement the backdoor desired would be to write soft-
ware). 
 75. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977).  
 76. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMEND-
MENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ix–x (4th ed. 2011) (showing a table of 
contents containing only one chapter on compelled speech and six chapters on 
other facets of First Amendment speech protection). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 78. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telcomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
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nized that the First Amendment also prohibits the state from 
compelling an individual or organization to speak.79 
The Constitution provides a range of standards to apply 
when evaluating regulation of speech. The highest level, “the 
most exacting scrutiny,” applies “to regulations that suppress, 
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech be-
cause of its content,” while “regulations that are unrelated to 
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of 
scrutiny.”80 When strict scrutiny applies, the regulation of 
speech must be (1) “narrowly tailored” (2) “to a compelling state 
interest.”81 Finally, regulations on content “worthless or of de 
minimis value to society” receive only minimal scrutiny.82 What 
level of standard to apply is the first step in determining what, 
if any, protection applies to a particular piece of speech. 
In addition to these general principles, over the years, the 
Court has articulated several points of guidance regarding 
compelled speech that are relevant to mandating encryption 
backdoors. The first recognition of First Amendment protection 
from compelled speech came in 1943, when the Court held that 
“involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even 
more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”83 Such 
grounds are present “only when the expression presents a clear 
and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered 
to prevent and punish.”84 In 1977, the Court recognized both 
that the state’s interest must be “sufficiently compelling” to 
make compelled speech permissible,85 and that one cannot be 
compelled to “contribute to the support of an ideological cause 
he may oppose.”86 Finally, in 1995, the Court recognized that “a 
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
 
U.S. 727, 739–40 (1996) (rejecting the application of “literal[ ] categorical 
standards” in favor of “continual development” based on “new circumstances”). 
 79. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (hold-
ing that the standard for compelling speech is even higher than that for cen-
soring it). 
 80. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
 81. Id. at 680 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
 82. Yvonne C. Ocrant, Comment, A Constitutional Challenge to Encryp-
tion Export Regulations: Software Is Speechless, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 519–
20 (1998) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White, 
J., concurring)). 
 83. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 633. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
 86. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
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constitutional protection.”87 Thus, a mandated expression may 
be something other than literal speech, and in such cases a 
mandate is impermissible unless there is a clear and present 
danger.88 
Though the preceding discussion focuses on political or ide-
ological statements, the Court has also been clear that the First 
Amendment’s protection also prohibits compelled speech in 
non-political contexts,89 albeit with a caveat not applicable to 
compelled software backdoors: commercial speech, or speech 
that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction,” re-
ceives less protection than other forms of expression.90 Thus, 
under the commercial speech doctrine, the government may re-
quire nutritional information,91 warnings, or disclaimers on 
products.92 Such a carve out is not applicable to software back-
doors, however, because they do considerably more than “pro-
pose a commercial transaction.”93 
In summary, the First Amendment provides various levels 
of protection for speech, depending on the character of the 
speech. That protection extends not just to limits on speech, but 
also to laws that would compel speech. Finally, an act need not 
be literal speech to be protected. 
2. Past Arguments on the Free Speech Status of Source Code 
Around the same time that the Clipper Chip program was 
developing, both courts and commentators had begun consider-
ing whether the First Amendment protects computer source 
code as speech.94 Although this question was never definitively 
 
 87. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995) (finding seclection of parade participants to be protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 88. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has argued that the Court should recon-
sider the clear and present danger test. Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion: In Face of 
Terrorism, Reassessing the First Amendment, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Nov. 29, 
2015), http://www.northjersey.com/opinion/opinion-guest-writers/in-the-face-of 
-terrorism-reassessing-the-first-amendment-1.1464277. To date, however, the 
Supreme Court has not moved in this direction. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001) 
(striking down a required contribution to pay for mushroom advertising). 
 90. Id. at 409. 
 91. E.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136 
(2d Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of injunction against a law requiring calorie 
information in New York restaurants). 
 92. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 n.1 (1995). 
 93. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 409. 
 94. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. 
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settled by the courts,95 following a series of three cases on the 
issue, various commentators developed arguments both in favor 
and against protecting source code under the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.96 This Subsection reviews the-
se arguments. 
a. Arguments Supporting Free Speech Protection for Source 
Code 
Prima facie, source code seems worthy of First Amendment 
protection. The First Amendment protects expression, and 
source code, among other things, allows programmers to ex-
press ideas to one another. Source code shares many of its 
characteristics with things that have been found to be protect-
ed, such as cookbooks.97 Both contain, in written form, a mix-
ture of English and numerical instructions.98 Both may be pub-
lished in a book.99 Both require some level of training to be able 
to understand the information they contain.100 More generally, 
both contain (what is intended to be) “truthful information.”101 
Given our country’s historical favoring of the expression of in-
formation,102 this strongly suggests that source code, like other 
forms of technical instructions, should be protected. 
 
Cal. 1997) (noting that Bernstein submitted his program for review in 1992). 
 95. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310–11 (finding export controls 
unconstitutional), with Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 
1996) (upholding export controls as constitutional). 
 96. See Crain, supra note 51 (summarizing Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 
708 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 
1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996); and Karn, 925 F. Supp. 1. 
 97. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2666 (2011) (listing a 
ban on the sale of cookbooks as the sort of action prohibited by the First 
Amendment). 
 98. Compare THE GOURMET COOKBOOK 852 (Ruth Reich ed., 2004) (con-
taining instructions on how to make vanilla bean ice cream), with 
Captainbowtie, PartAnalysisPane.java, GITHUB (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www 
.github.com/captainbowtie/MockStats/blob/MockStats-1-(Swing)/ 
PartAnalysisPane.java (containing instructions on how to calculate statistics 
for a mock trial competitor from information in a referenced database). 
 99. Compare THE GOURMET COOKBOOK, supra note 98, with GADDIS, su-
pra note 16. 
 100. Cf. Linda Larsen, How To Read a Baking Recipe, ABOUT FOOD (Oct. 
13, 2014), http://www.busycooks.about.com/od/howtobake/a/readabakingreci 
.htm (providing instructions on how to read a recipe). 
 101. Cf. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (reject-
ing the argument that the government had an interest in restricting the flow 
of truthful information to prevent the public from making bad decisions with 
that information). 
 102. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980) 
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At a more technical level, source code meets constitutional 
standards to be considered speech. The First Amendment pro-
tects both literal speech, spoken and written, as well as “inher-
ently expressive” conduct.103 Although not all written speech is 
protected,104 source code falls within the sphere of protection. 
Unlike the picketing signs of Giboney105 or the “White Appli-
cants Only” sign referred to in Rumsfeld,106 source code is not 
speech as a means to some illegal end. Rather, source code is, 
at least in some instances, intended primarily to have an ex-
pressive purpose, with any “conduct” resulting being merely in-
cidental.107 Although no court has ever ruled on the issue, The 
Anarchist Cookbook is likely protected,108 despite teaching its 
readers how to make a bomb.109 So, too, should source code be 
protected, even though it may enable its users to prevent the 
interception of their communications. 
In addition to the expressive nature of source code, some 
commentators have advanced an independent “free speech val-
ues” argument.110 Under this view, because source code facili-
 
(plurality opinion) (noting a history of openness). 
 103. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65–66 
(2006) (analyzing whether conduct was inherently expressive after rejecting 
the argument that it was literal speech). 
 104. Id. at 62 (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of 
speech . . . to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was 
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spo-
ken, written, or printed.” (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 
U.S. 490, 502 (1949))). 
 105. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502. 
 106. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62. 
 107. This leaves open the cases where source code is not intended to be ex-
pressive. Additional arguments that source code is still worthy of protection, 
even in this instance, are raised in the next paragraph. See also infra Part 
III.B (discussing the problems that would arise in trying to assess whether 
source code was intended to be expressive on a case-by-case basis). 
 108. Tony Dokoupil, After Latest Shooting, Murder Manual Author Calls 
for Book To Be Taken ‘Immediately’ out of Print, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/after-latest-shooting-murder-manual 
-author-calls-book-be-taken-f2D11758543 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). But see Susan Jones, Sen. Feinstein: ‘Anarchist Cook-
book’ Not ‘Protected by the First Amendment,’ CNSNEWS.COM (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/sen-feinstein-anarchist-cookbook 
-not-protected-first-amendment. 
 109. WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK 113 (1971). 
 110. See, e.g., Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Com-
puter Source Code in the Age of YouTube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 326 (2012) (“If a particular activity is found to 
be . . . central to the development of a medium for the expression of ideas, then 
the court must engage in a comprehensive analysis of First Amendment val-
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tates free speech, it is itself worthy of protection, even if source 
code is not itself speech.111 The classic example is that of a mov-
ie projector.112 The possession of a movie projector is itself clear-
ly not an expressive or communicative act. Nevertheless, “[i]f 
the state were to prohibit the use of projectors without a li-
cense, First Amendment coverage would undoubtedly be trig-
gered.”113 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has held that regulations 
regarding the placement and designs of newspaper racks trig-
gered First Amendment concerns.114 Because source code, like 
film projectors or newspaper racks, is central to the develop-
ment of the medium of the Internet and all its component 
communication technologies, it should likewise be protected 
under the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.115 
b. Arguments Opposing Free Speech Protection for Source 
Code 
Arguments against protection generally focus on rejecting 
the expressive nature of source code. Specifically, the argument 
takes the view that despite all the information source code may 
contain, it is ultimately just a tool for some further, not neces-
sarily communicative, end.116 
There are two components to this “lack of expression” ar-
gument. First, source code is the implementation of an idea, ra-
ther than the expression of the idea itself.117 Put another way, 
unlike books or films, “source code is fundamentally different 
 
ues . . . .”); see also Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First 
Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (“[The First Amend-
ment] extends to forms of interaction that realize First Amendment values.”). 
 111. Roig, supra note 110 (“Activities and devices that facilitate the devel-
opment of a medium for the expression of ideas, though not themselves ‘ex-
pressive,’ trigger First Amendment coverage as readily as traditional 
speech.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Post, supra note 110, at 717 (giving the movie projector ex-
ample); Roig, supra note 110, at 341–42 (framing the discussion in terms of 
Post’s example). 
 113. Post, supra note 110, at 717. 
 114. See Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1143 
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding regulations to limit placement and design were an un-
constitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press). 
 115. Roig, supra note 110, at 345. 
 116. See, e.g., Katherine A. Moerke, Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption 
Software Source Code Is Not Constitutionally Protected “Speech” Under the 
First Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1042–47 (2000) (arguing source code 
is not the expression of an idea, but merely the implementation of it). 
 117. Id. at 1044. 
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from these examples, whose primary function is expression. 
The function of source code is . . . to program a computer.”118 
Although this form of implementing the idea may convey some 
information about the idea itself, “the First Amendment is not 
so broad as to protect all implementation of ideas.”119 Building 
off of this functionalist view of source code, the argument pro-
ceeds to analogize writing a computer program to building a 
machine.120 Just as the building of certain devices may be re-
stricted or outright prohibited without raising First Amend-
ment concerns,121 prohibiting the writing of particular types of 
source code also does not trigger First Amendment concerns. 
In summary, encryption backdoors raise First Amendment 
questions because encryption software comes from source code, 
which is arguably communicative. Past attempts to regulate 
encryption have not resulted in a clear statement of whether 
that protection actually exists, nor have they addressed how 
mandated source code may differ from restraints on source 
code. The following Part addresses both of these questions. 
II.  EVADING ENCRYPTION: HOW MANDATED 
BACKDOORS IMPLICATE COMPELLED SPEECH 
CONCERNS   
Given the government’s history of regulating encryption, 
one might be led to believe that present calls for companies to 
include backdoors neatly fall into past treatment of encryption, 
and, like past efforts, should be permitted under the First 
Amendment, or at least be subject to similar analysis as export 
control regulations. Although there is substantial overlap be-
tween encryption regulations of the past and proposals for 
modern backdoors, requiring modern backdoors significantly 
differs from encryption programs of the past in several key as-
pects. This Part examines these differences and overlaps, high-
lighting aspects that lead to different First Amendment analy-
sis than in the past. It then analyzes those First Amendment 
issues, showing how they play out for mandated software en-
cryption backdoors. 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1045. 
 120. See id.  
 121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 832(c) (2012) (prohibiting the building of a nucle-
ar weapon). 
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A. DISTINGUISHING MANDATED SOFTWARE BACKDOORS FROM 
ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS OF THE PAST 
As both calls for mandated backdoors and the programs 
described in Part I.B.1 involve the regulation of encryption, it 
may seem natural to assume that the legality of the present 
program turns on the legality of those past programs. However, 
though both past and present efforts involve the regulation of 
encryption, they differ in several key aspects that impact a con-
stitutional analysis of calls for present-day regulation.122 
Past attempts to curtail the release of encryption technolo-
gies can be largely broken into two programs. The first is the 
effort, beginning in the Cold War and continuing into the early 
2000s, of the United States government to limit the exportation 
of encryption machines and software.123 The second is the effort, 
initiated in the early 1990s but largely abandoned by the mid-
dle of that decade, to get United States technology companies to 
voluntarily integrate the Clipper Chip into their communica-
tions products.124 The former differs from present regulations by 
applying only to software exports, while the latter differs be-
cause of its entirely voluntary nature.  
The export ban of the second half of the twentieth century 
is distinguishable from proposed encryption backdoors because 
the export ban had a narrower focus. As the name suggests, the 
export ban focused solely on exports.125 Although the constitu-
tionality of even this narrow scope is doubtful,126 assuming it is 
a valid prior restraint on speech, the much broader applicabil-
ity of encryption backdoors to all domestic products calls for an 
independent analysis. This is both because the scope of the re-
striction is much larger (all products versus only exports) and 
because the interests of law enforcement and the general public 
likely receive different weights than they do in the export ban 
context. Furthermore, although the export ban and backdoors 
involve substantial overlap in regards to the free speech analy-
sis that applies, the export ban was a prior restraint on 
speech,127 while backdoors implicate compelled speech concerns. 
As a result of these differences, the analysis of encryption 
 
 122. See infra Part III.A. 
 123. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 728. 
 124. Levy, supra note 54. 
 125. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49. 
 126. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1310–11 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding unconstitutional several of the export controls). 
 127. Id. at 1310. 
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backdoors involves considering a wider variety of law enforce-
ment tools. There is only one way to stop the spread of infor-
mation: limiting the communication of that information. How-
ever, there are several ways to gain access to information 
beyond requiring broad encryption backdoors.128 
Turning to the Clipper Chip, mandatory encryption back-
doors are fundamentally different than the voluntary Clipper 
Chip encryption “solution” suggested in the 1990s. Unlike pre-
sent calls for “mandatory” backdoors, the Clipper Chip program 
was never required.129 Instead, it was billed as an optional tool 
for companies to easily integrate encryption into their prod-
ucts.130 Given this entirely optional nature, the Clipper Chip 
raised none of the compelled speech issues that backdoors raise. 
As a result of these differences between both the export control 
programs and the Clipper Chip, legal analysis of these past 
programs does not necessarily imply similar results for a mod-
ern backdoor mandate. 
B. ANALYZING WHETHER SOURCE CODE CONSTITUTES SPEECH 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Despite the differences outlined above, modern calls for en-
cryption backdoors and the export restrictions of the past do 
have one thing in common: both seek to regulate computer 
source code.131 Whether or not source code is even protected by 
the First Amendment has been a point of contention since the 
late 1990s, and the courts of that era never came to a uniform 
conclusion.132 Furthermore, with the end of the export ban in 
 
 128. See infra Part III.B (discussing how investigators can gain access to 
communications without infringing on the First Amendment). 
 129. Compare Shane Harris, Feds Want ‘Backdoor’ into Phones, While Ter-
rorists Walk Through Front Door, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www 
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/30/feds-want-backdoor-into-phones 
-while-terrorists-walk-through-front-door.html (noting renewed calls to re-
strict encryption technology), with Levy, supra note 54 (noting the voluntary 
nature of the Clipper Chip). 
 130. Levy, supra note 54. 
 131. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1306 (analyzing the exportation of 
source code), with Trevor Timm, Weak Encryption Won’t Defeat Terrorists — 
But It Will Enable Hackers, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/10/weak-encryption-wont-defeat 
-terrorists-but-it-will-enable-hackers (discussing encryption tool’s source code 
regarding modern backdoors). 
 132. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310–11 (finding export controls 
unconstitutional), with Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 
1996) (upholding export controls as constitutional). 
  
322 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:301 
 
the early 2000s, the debate became largely academic.133 As a 
starting point, First Amendment protection for source code is a 
necessary condition for encryption backdoors to raise compelled 
speech concerns. The debate over the applicability of the First 
Amendment to source code continues to this day, with in-
creased fervency as the Internet has come to play a significant 
role in the average American’s life. This Section analyzes past 
commentators’ consideration of this issue,134 arguing that 
source code ought to fall within the protections of the First 
Amendment. Part I.C.2 introduced arguments both for and 
against protecting source code under the First Amendment. An 
analysis of these arguments indicates that source code ought to 
be protected, though for different reasons in different cases. 
As a starting point, it is fairly uncontroversial that if a 
piece of source code is expressive, it should be protected. Even 
writers that believe source code should not be protected agree 
that if it was expressive, it would be worthy of protection.135 
Thus, in instances where source code is intended to communi-
cate an idea, source code should be protected as itself communi-
cating that idea. 
In other instances, however, detractors are correct to point 
out that source code was written not to communicate an idea, 
but entirely as a tool to enable a machine to carry out a task. In 
these instances, the “expressive content” argument in favor of 
First Amendment protection does not stand up to scrutiny. 
However, it can be very difficult to distinguish the purpose for 
which a particular piece of source code was written.136 Never-
theless, assuming the purpose can be distinguished, in cases 
where a solely non-communicative purpose can be determined, 
advocates for First Amendment protection can fall back to the 
“First Amendment Values” argument, which, in the context of 
source code for communication products (which encryption 
clearly falls into), will almost universally be persuasive. 
 
 133. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33. 
 134. See supra Part I.C.2 (introducing these issues). 
 135. See, e.g., Moerke, supra note 116, at 1029 (suggesting that if source 
code was “written to make a statement” it would be protected speech). 
 136. This difficulty is discussed in more detail in a later paragraph in this 
Section. 
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1. The “Expressive Content” Argument Covers Most Source 
Code 
When the First Amendment classification of source code 
was last considered in earnest, Internet usage was in its infan-
cy.137 In 1997, less than half the country had Internet access in 
the home.138 Groups advocating for the publishing of source 
code were uncommon at that time. For example, the Open 
Source Initiative, a leading group in such advocacy, was not 
founded until 1998.139 As a result, it (perhaps) made sense to 
say that source code was non-communicative at that time, be-
cause it was unlikely that source code would be communicated 
to a large audience. This is no longer the case. Though develop-
ers may publish source code for many reasons, one reason is to 
“understand [a program’s] functioning.”140 Such a goal suggests 
that the source code itself, even if it is the particular implemen-
tation of an idea, still performs an educative function: teaching 
other individuals how a computer program functions as well as 
how they could implement it themselves. Such educative mate-
rials fall within the ambit of First Amendment protections and 
thus cover open source software code.141 
This treatment of open source code, however, leaves a 
noteworthy gap in the universe of source code’s protection. 
First, although many of the encryption technologies at issue are 
open source,142 the most well-known instance is not.143 Though 
 
 137. Cf. THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 1 
(2014) (documenting the rise of Internet usage between the mid-1980s and 
2013). 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. History of the OSI, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Sept. 2012), http:// 
opensource.org/history. 
 140. Richard Stallman, Why Free Software Is More Important Now than 
Ever Before, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2013) (emphasis added), https://www.wired.com/ 
2013/09/why-free-software-is-more-important-now-than-ever-before. 
 141. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (finding First 
Amendment coverage for things that teach doctrine). 
 142. Indeed, this open source nature limits the effectiveness of backdoor 
regulations, even if the government could constitutionally mandate them. See 
Timm, supra note 131. 
 143. Specifically, Apple’s iMessage system, which encrypts messages sent 
between two iPhone users, is not. See Daniel Eran Dilger, EFF Ranks Apple’s 
iMessage, FaceTime “Best Mass Market Options” for Secure Messaging, Ahead 
of BlackBerry Messenger, Google Hangouts, Facebook, Microsoft Skype, 
APPLEINSIDER (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.appleinsider.com/articles/14/11/05/ 
eff-ranks-apples-imessage-facetime-best-mass-market-options-for-secure 
-messaging-ahead-of-blackberry-messenger-google-hangouts-facebook 
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the First Amendment applies to intrusions into the internal 
writings of a group just as much as to public writings,144 there 
still remains a gap in code covered by the First Amendment: 
source code that is not intended to be communicative. The ar-
gument against treating source code as expressive carries the 
most weight at this point: if the source code is not intended to 
convey information to others, then it does not seem plausible to 
say that it triggers any First Amendment concerns. Although 
this line of reasoning has theoretical appeal, it presents a large 
practical problem: How does one distinguish between expres-
sive and non-expressive code? For small programs, it may be 
possible to query the program author and simply ask their in-
tentions. Such an approach for larger programs, however, is 
implausible. The Linux kernel (the core component of many 
major operating systems), for example, has had almost 12,000 
developers contribute to its source code since 2005.145 Contact-
ing each and every one of those developers would be an exercise 
in futility. At best, a court could speculate as to developer in-
tent, based on the nature of the software, its development phi-
losophy, and any other indirect evidence that makes a particu-
lar intention more or less likely to be present in that particular 
case. Such an approach, however, would necessarily be an ap-
proximation. 
2. The “Free Speech Values” Argument Covers All Encryption 
Software Not Addressed by the “Expressive Content” Argument 
Even if this hurdle could be overcome, and every developer 
could (truthfully) indicate that they did not intend to express 
any idea when writing their code, there would still remain the 
“free speech values” argument. Few writers have developed 
counterarguments to this line of thought other than to merely 
presume the negative—that constructions which facilitate 
speech are not themselves protected by the First Amendment.146 
 
-microsoft-skype. 
 144. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (noting intru-
sion into “internal structure or affairs of an association” may impinge on First 
Amendment freedoms (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 
(1984))). 
 145. JONATHAN CORBET ET AL., LINUX KERNEL DEVELOPMENT: HOW FAST 
IS IT GOING, WHO IS DOING IT, WHAT ARE THEY DOING AND WHO IS SPONSOR-
ING THE WORK 2 (2015). 
 146. See, e.g., Ocrant, supra note 82, at 540 (stating that the “motors, lev-
ers, gears and wires” of a newspaper printer are not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
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Such a view, however, is unsupported by Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the First Amendment, which have extended pro-
tection to activities beyond pure speech into “conduct commonly 
associated with [speech].”147 
This combination of the “expressive content” argument and 
the “free speech values” argument collectively bring most 
source code within the coverage of the First Amendment. Nev-
ertheless, such a rationalization for protection will still not pro-
tect all source code, but rather only source code that is intended 
as communicative or related to communications. This leaves a 
noteworthy gap, specifically for non-communicative devices. 
Though such a gap may seem problematic for First Amendment 
protection at first glance, in reality, its effect is very minimal as 
regards the present encryption backdoor debate. Thus far, the 
information sought by law enforcement has been chiefly com-
munications.148 Thus, for the purposes of the present descrip-
tion of encryption backdoors, the combination of the two argu-
ments covers all the source code at issue. 
In summary, in the Internet-connected age, source code 
will generally be expressive enough to warrant potential First 
Amendment protection, because much of source code, though 
written primarily to control a computer, is also written with the 
goal of communicating valuable information to other develop-
ers. Furthermore, to the extent a particular piece of code is not 
expressive, in the communication context (with which encryp-
tion is necessarily concerned) its potential for protection will 
still be supported by the “Free Speech Values” argument, as 
source code that makes encryption possible is a tool that readi-
ly contributes to making the communication of expressive con-
tent possible. 
C. ANALYZING BROAD BACKDOORS: STRICT SCRUTINY DOES NOT 
PERMIT UNIVERSAL BACKDOORS 
Given that source code falls within the protection of the 
First Amendment, this Section examines whether or not laws 
requiring backdoor implementation would nevertheless be 
permissible. Applying the First Amendment jurisprudence de-
scribed in Section I.C, it concludes that universal encryption 
backdoors as desired by individuals like the FBI Director would 
 
 147. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988). 
 148. See Thomas, supra note 2 (noting the FBI was being challenged by 
“encrypted communications” (emphasis added)). 
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impermissibly require compelled speech even in the presence of 
a specific “clear and present danger.” 
Just because source code is protectable by the First 
Amendment does not mean that compelled encryption back-
doors are necessarily unconstitutional. In the prior restraint 
arena, for instance, content such as child pornography has trig-
gered a First Amendment analysis, but prohibiting its distribu-
tion was constitutionally permitted nevertheless.149 This Part 
first analyzes what level of scrutiny should be applied to en-
cryption backdoors, and then, having concluded that strict 
scrutiny applies, argues that under no circumstances would the 
broad-sweeping backdoors being sought be permitted under the 
First Amendment. 
1. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Encryption Backdoors 
As noted in Part I.C.1, the Constitution provides a range of 
standards to apply when evaluating regulation of speech. As an 
initial matter, source code clearly does not fall within the 
treatment of the commercial speech doctrine. Commercial 
speech is limited to speech that “does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”150 Source code is not such a proposal, 
but rather instructions on how to perform a particular task. 
Additionally, strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny ap-
plies unless the content of speech is worthless to society.151 
Communicating how to implement strong encryption has worth 
to society. Without it, the development secure software would 
be greatly hindered, and everything from bank records to medi-
cal information would be vulnerable to attack.152 
The more interesting (and difficult) question is whether 
regulations of encryption source code should receive intermedi-
 
 149. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). 
 150. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). 
 151. Ocrant, supra note 82 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
400 (1992) (White, J., concurring)). 
 152. See Cory Doctorow, Encryption Won’t Work If It Has a Back Door Only 
the ‘Good Guys’ Have Keys to, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2015), https://www 
.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/01/encryption-wont-work-if-it-has-a 
-back-door-only-the-good-guys-have-keys-to. But see Ocrant, supra note 82, at 
542. After arguing that source code should not receive any protection, Ocrant 
concedes that if it is protected, regulations of source code should receive only 
minimal scrutiny. Id. This argument is based, however, on the reasoning that 
because it should not receive strict or intermediate scrutiny, it must default to 
minimal scrutiny. Id. at 541–42. Ocrant does not analyze what makes encryp-
tion source code “worthless to society.” See id. at 542. 
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ate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. In cases of restraints on speech, 
the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is 
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys.”153 Com-
pelled speech, however, adds a wrinkle to this inquiry, because 
the government is not trying to censor a message with which it 
disagrees, but rather trying to modify the message to suit the 
government’s own end. Nevertheless, the Court has been clear 
that the same level of scrutiny applies to compelled speech as to 
compelled silence (prior restraints).154 The inquiry, therefore, 
when the government is attempting to compel a particular 
message, could be characterized as whether the government 
has adopted a regulation requiring speech because the govern-
ment seeks to force the conveyance of a particular message. 
There is not a straightforward answer to this question. No 
court has directly addressed the issue of compelled source code 
speech, and those that have addressed the issue of restraints on 
source code speech have come out on both sides.155 Here the dis-
tinction between prior restraints of the past and the compelled 
nature of backdoors today comes into play. Unlike the prior re-
straint at issue in Bernstein, encryption backdoors would re-
quire the expression of a particular idea, specifically “this is 
how you encrypt information and here is a backdoor to allow 
the government access to that information.” The emphasized 
portion is a particular message that the software author (pre-
sumably) does not wish to convey, but is being compelled to do 
so by government regulation. This makes such regulation con-
tent-specific, as it is a regulation based on “[agreement or disa-
greement] with the message it conveys.”156 
 
 153. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 154. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
796–97 (1988) (“There is certainly some difference between compelled speech 
and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is 
without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees free-
dom of speech, a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say 
and what not to say.”). 
 155. Compare Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(finding export restriction to be a content-neutral regulation because “[t]he de-
fendants are not regulating the export of the diskette because of the expres-
sive content of the comments and or source code, but . . . because of the belief 
that . . . it [is] easier for foreign intelligence sources to encode their communi-
cations”), with Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1307 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997) (finding export restriction to be subject to strict scrutiny). 
 156. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
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As a content specific regulation, encryption backdoors must 
withstand strict scrutiny. Such regulations must “promote a 
compelling interest” through “the least restrictive means to fur-
ther the articulated interest.”157 Although not free from doubt, 
there is a likely a compelling interest in requiring encryption 
backdoors, because they have the potential to reduce crime.158 
This doubt arises because there is at least some reason to be-
lieve that requiring encryption backdoors would have little to 
no effect on the actual encryption used by criminals.159 It may 
be the case that if encryption backdoors are implemented into 
products made by companies responsive to regulation, crimi-
nals would simply move to using tools from darker parts of the 
Internet that are less responsive to regulation.160 Nevertheless, 
while the extent to which such regulation would be effective is 
questionable, it would likely have at least some margin of im-
pact. For example, in November 2015 terrorists in France coor-
dinated their attack (ultimately killing 130 people) using unen-
crypted text messages that could have been intercepted without 
any encryption backdoors,161 but one can easily imagine them 
using encrypted iMessages instead,162 just as the San Bernardi-
no attackers did. If that had been the case, then only with 
backdoors present would the government have been able to in-
tercept their messages. 
 
 157. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 158. See David Auerbach, There Is No Good Argument for Encryption 
Backdoors, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
bitwise/2015/11/encryption_backdoors_won_t_make_us_safer_from_terrorism_ 
john_brennan_john.html. 
 159. See id. (“If secure encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have se-
cure encryption.”). Although only tangential to a constitutionality discussion, 
as a practical matter, it is of significant, if not overriding, importance that 
were encryption backdoors actually implemented, criminals of any skill would 
simply shift to using already-existing open source programs that do not have 
any backdoors. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Dan Froomkin, Signs Point to Unencrypted Communications Between 
Terror Suspects, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 18, 2015), https://theintercept.com/ 
2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypted-communications-between-terror 
-suspects. 
 162. Cf. Mike Elgan, Why It’s Time for Apple To Open FaceTime, CULT OF 
MAC (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.cultofmac.com/247673/why-its-time-for-apple 
-to-open-facetime (noting users could switch between SMS and iMessage 
“without thinking about it”). 
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2. Broad Encryption Backdoors Do Not Survive a Strict 
Scrutiny Analysis 
Despite promoting a compelling government interest, wide-
sweeping encryption backdoors meet a fatal flaw when consid-
ering whether or not they are narrowly tailored to achieve the 
government’s interest. Every day, over six-billion text messages 
are sent.163 The vast majority of these communications are (one 
would hope) not communications between terrorists. Neverthe-
less, each and every one of these communications would be sub-
ject to backdoor access. Putting aside the massive privacy con-
cerns that has the potential to raise,164 such access is not 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve the government’s interest. In a 
related context, the Supreme Court has struck down laws re-
stricting speech on the basis that they were not narrowly tai-
lored to preventing “advocacy . . . directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action.”165 Similarly, in the context of 
encryption backdoors, any effective law requiring the installa-
tion of backdoors would invade into the sphere of communica-
tions where there is no government interest in having backdoor 
access. To pass constitutional muster, the law would have to be 
so narrow as to be of very limited effect in gaining access to 
communications, but in order to be effective, the law would ne-
cessitate adding backdoor access to communications where 
there is no compelling government interest. 
III.  CONFRONTING COMPULSION: HOW COURTS AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD TREAT REQUESTS FOR 
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS   
Given that source code falls within the protection of the 
First Amendment, this Part examines what means are left to 
investigators for accessing encrypted information. Although 
laws requiring broad backdoors would likely violate the First 
Amendment, there are strong public policy considerations fa-
voring alternatives that would support law enforcement objec-
 
 163. Michael O’Grady, SMS Usage Remains Strong in the US: 6 Billion 
SMS Messages Are Sent Each Day, FORRESTER (June 19, 2012), http://www 
.blogs.forrester.com/michael_ogrady/12-06-19sms_usage_remains_strong_in_ 
the_us_6_billion_sms_messages_are_sent_each_day. 
 164. See generally Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, 
Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 359 (2010) (discussing the privacy implications of govern-
ment backdoors). 
 165. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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tives requiring access to encrypted information. This Part pre-
sents two technological solutions that pass First Amendment 
muster, as well as an acknowledgement that in at least some 
circumstances, law enforcement may be left, as in the case of 
encryption and the Fifth Amendment, with having to make do 
without the information desired. This Part then makes several 
preliminary suggestions for a statutory framework that could 
implement the stronger of these two solutions, and concludes 
by addressing counterarguments to the proposed solution. 
A. WHAT’S AN INVESTIGATOR TO DO? GETTING AT 
COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In light of the preceding discussion, it may appear that in-
vestigators are stuck between a rock and a hard place. Back-
doors would either be too constrained to be effective or too 
broad to be constitutional. However, there are responses to this 
dilemma that satisfy both technological and constitutional re-
quirements. This Section introduces some of these possible so-
lutions. Notably, the solutions proposed are somewhat con-
sistent with the draft Compliance with Court Orders Act of 
2016 language, at least as I interpret it.166 The solutions below 
do not require changes to a company’s product en masse, but do 
require steps to be taken in particular circumstances. Although 
they admittedly do not provide the coverage that comprehen-
sive encryption backdoors would provide, these solutions may 
serve as a starting point for examining further tools that would 
aid law enforcement while still respecting the boundaries put 
in place by the Constitution. 
1. Permitted Compelled Speech: Utilize Existing 
Technological Limitations in Encryption Products To Obtain 
the Desired Information on an Individual Basis 
Although the encryption of a communication may be un-
breakable, attempting to insert backdoors to make it breakable 
is not the only way to gain access to communications.167 There 
 
 166. See supra note 71 (discussing differing interpretations). Note that un-
der the reading some other authors have given the draft language, the pro-
posed solutions would not be consistent with the Act, as they read the Act as 
mandating universal backdoors, which, as discussed supra, are not permissi-
ble under the First Amendment. 
 167. For example, it is possible to trick someone into downloading what 
appears to be a software update, but what in actuality is a program that inter-
cepts communications before they are encrypted. See, e.g., Michael Kassner, 
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are other ways of gaining access to information stored on an 
encrypted device that can be more narrowly tailored, so as to 
pass the strict scrutiny of the First Amendment. What follows 
are two possible responses targeted at the iPhone168 that would 
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. Under circumstances 
where probable cause exists, a court could order a company to 
take either of the proceeding actions to assist in carrying out a 
warrant, without running against the First Amendment. 
a. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Intercepting “Live” 
Communications 
The first vulnerability law enforcement could use to obtain 
live access to communications is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack. This vulnerability is so named because the interceptor 
“stands” in the middle of the two communicating parties, de-
ceiving both the sender into believing the message is going di-
rectly to the recipient and the receiver into believing the mes-
sage is coming directly from the sender.169 In the case of a 
system like iMessage, because Apple controls its encryption key 
infrastructure, it could surreptitiously use encryption keys pro-
vided by the government to effect its encryption, with the send-
 
Malware Poses as Software Updates: Why the FBI Is Warning Travelers, 
TECHREPUBLIC (May 14, 2012, 12:55 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it 
-security/malware-poses-as-software-updates-why-the-fbi-is-warning 
-travelers. 
 168. This discussion centers on the iPhone given its prominence in news 
coverage regarding law enforcement access to encrypted information. These 
forms of intercept could be converted to other communications media, subject 
to the caveats described in the discussion. 
 169. TOM’S GUIDE Staff & Ryan Goodrich, What Is a Man in the Middle At-
tack?, TOM’S GUIDE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://tomsguide.com/us/man-in-the 
-middle-attack,news-17755.html. To go into a bit more detail, suppose Eve 
wants to intercept a message sent from Alice to Bob. Ordinarily, Alice would 
be able to send a secure message to Bob by finding Bob’s public key, using that 
key to encrypt her message, and then sending the message to Bob. Only Bob 
would be able to decrypt the message, by using his private key. In an MITM 
attack, Eve impersonates Bob (generally by having a privileged position such 
that when Alice looks online for Bob’s public key, she unknowingly gets Eve’s 
instead). Then when Alice encrypts her message, she uses Eve’s key instead of 
Bob’s. Eve intercepts the message in transit, and because it was encrypted 
with her public key, Eve can use her private key to decrypt it. After reading 
the message, Eve can re-encrypt the message using Bob’s real public key and 
send the message onto him, with neither Alice nor Bob any the wiser. See Mat-
thew Copeland et al., The GNU Privacy Handbook, GNUPG (1999), https:// 
www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html (discussing information utilized in the 
example under the chapter 3 heading). 
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er and receiver being none the wiser.170 Doing this for all iPhone 
users would raise the same narrow tailoring concerns as broad 
encryption backdoors. However, for specific individuals (based 
on information that the individual’s communications are relat-
ed to a criminal investigation sufficient to allow a warrant to 
issue) such an approach would not raise overbreadth concerns. 
It is, however, worth noting that while such an approach would 
grant access to systems like iMessage, where there is some cen-
tral authority managing the encryption key infrastructure, it 
would be inapplicable to a distributed key system.171 Additional-
ly, such an attack would be capable of intercepting only com-
munications sent from the point in time when the man-in-the-
middle position is established.172 Unless past communications 
were sent over the (now compromised) channel, there would be 
no way to intercept them.173 
b. Custom-Crafted Updates: Compelled Speech That Is 
Sufficiently Narrowly Tailored 
As a result of the aforementioned limitations, law enforce-
ment may desire additional tools to access communications that 
a man-in-the-middle attack does not cover. Fortunately for 
them, Apple’s (and other cellphone vendor’s) privileged position 
provides such a solution. As the operating system developer for 
the iPhone, Apple has a great deal of control over the software 
on it, including the software updates. On other platforms, mali-
cious software updates have been used to compromise computer 
security integrity.174 Given the closed nature of iOS, Apple could 
implement such an update either without any notification to 
 
 170. See Dennis Fisher, Apple iMessage open to Man in the Middle, Spoof-
ing Attacks, THREATPOST (Oct. 17, 2013), https://threatpost.com/apple 
-imessage-open-to-man-in-the-middle-spoofing-attacks/102610; see also supra 
Part I.A.2 (discussing the technicalities of encryption key systems). Replace 
Alice, Bob, and Eve with iPhone User 1, iPhone User 2, and Apple, respective-
ly, in the example supra note 169, and that example is precisely what the gov-
ernment could require. 
 171. This approach is inapplicable because such an MITM attack relies on 
the privileged position of the directory operator to be able to transparently al-
ter the public keys it provides when people request them. See Fisher, supra 
note 170 (noting that systems “without a central directory” would not be vul-
nerable to this type of attack). 
 172. See TOM’S GUIDE Staff & Goodrich, supra note 169 (noting that man-
in-the-middle attacks are limited to communications exchanged after the relay 
between the two parties is established). 
 173. See id. 
 174. Kassner, supra note 167. 
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the user or as an innocuous update that hides its true pur-
pose.175 Once installed, such an update could grant access to 
past encrypted communications, as well as any other infor-
mation saved on the phone.176 As was the case with man-in-the-
middle attacks, while such action may raise broadness prob-
lems if applied to all users, when only requested for specific in-
dividuals, such an attack likely satisfies the narrow tailoring 
requirements of the First Amendment.177 
2. Beyond Compelled Speech: Find Other Ways To Get the 
Information or Do Without It 
Although the suggestions above provide some possibilities 
for access to encrypted information, they are still imperfect so-
lutions. Both rely on the privileged position of a particular par-
ty in order to gain access to communications, and, as the exam-
ples make clear, that privileged position simply does not exist 
for all communications. In such cases, it may simply be the case 
that an investigator must make do with the information ob-
tainable by constitutional means, just as is the case with more 
traditional forms of evidence gathering. 
The reality that some evidence is simply beyond the consti-
tutional reach of investigators is not a new idea. Indeed, de-
spite computer encryption’s relative novelty, there are already 
several cases in the Fifth Amendment context from which to 
draw parallels in regards to access to encrypted information.178 
These cases support the view that when it comes to encryption, 
there may simply be some cases where investigators cannot get 
 
 175. Cf. J. O’Dell, Linux Chief: ‘Open Source Is Safer, and Linux Is More 
Secure than Any Other OS’ (Exclusive), VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 26, 2013), http:// 
venturebeat.com/2013/11/26/linux-chief-open-source-is-safer-and-linux-is-more 
-secure-than-any-other-os-exclusive/ (noting that closed source programs are 
vulnerable to having backdoors implemented without consumer knowledge). 
 176. See Juli Clover, ‘Masque Attack’ Vulnerability Allows Malicious Third-
Party iOS Apps To Masquerade as Legitimate Apps, MACRUMORS  
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.macrumors.com/2014/11/10/masque-attack-ios-
vulnerability. 
 177. Of course, such an attack would also have to satisfy the privacy re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the statutory requirements 
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See generally WILLIAM 
MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 340–63 (2016) (discussing 
the legal requirements for law enforcement to intercept electronic communica-
tions and access stored communications). 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668–69 
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding that compelling a defendant to reveal his encryption 
password amounts to self-incrimination). 
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at the information desired. Although circumstances have led to 
alternative outcomes in some cases,179 in some instances, courts 
have recognized that a defendant cannot be compelled to turn 
over her password, even when the failure to do so effectively 
cuts off a key source of information.180 Though law enforcement 
can overcome this issue by granting a suspect immunity,181 in 
some cases, only the primary key password holder may be the 
person the government wants to charge. In such cases, the only 
recourse is to seek the password information from another per-
son with knowledge of it.182 
Similarly, in regards to communication backdoors, if inves-
tigators are unhappy with the limited compelled speech options 
constitutionally available to them, they must either find a per-
missible means of obtaining the information (through the per-
mitted technical solutions described above or through less 
technical means such as getting the suspect’s cooperation in ac-
cessing the encrypted information) or simply do without it. Fur-
thermore, unlike the Fifth Amendment context, no grant of 
immunity can remedy the situation. While such a grant allows 
for the protection of the interests implicated by the Fifth 
Amendment by preventing the disclosure or information de-
rived from it from being used against the individual making the 
statement,183 a grant of immunity does not resolve the First 
Amendment issue. Grants of immunity do not protect the inter-
est of a speaker being able to control the content of his or her 
message, and thus, unlike in the context of the Fifth Amend-
ment, they cannot convert an unconstitutional backdoor into a 
constitutional one. 
B. WORKING TOWARDS A TECHNICAL SOLUTION: STEPS TO TAKE 
TOWARDS ACHIEVING NARROWLY TAILORED BACKDOORS 
Of the two solutions proposed, narrowly tailored backdoors 
would permit access to more information, allowing access not 
 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. 
Colo. 2012) (noting that where “the government knows of the existence and 
location of the computer’s files” there is no Fifth Amendment protection). 
 180. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 
2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing a Fifth Amend-
ment right to not turn over encryption password). 
 181. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972). 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding search of a computer conducted after defendant’s wife gave law en-
forcement the password). 
 183. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956). 
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just to communications transmitted after access is established 
but also to past communications stored on a device.184 Thus, 
when possible, narrowly tailored backdoors better services the 
public interest law enforcement is attempting to vindicate 
when it seeks to gain access to an encrypted device. This Sec-
tion proposes statutory structure that would aim to make such 
an access regime possible. 
As a first step toward implementing the proposed solution, 
Congress should work with technology companies and law en-
forcement to develop a formal structure for requesting device 
access. Currently, no such framework exists, and, as law en-
forcement’s attempts to nevertheless force cooperation in the 
San Bernardino case suggest,185 the absence of such a frame-
work makes it difficult for law enforcement to easily gain ac-
cess when needed and legitimizes technology companies’ con-
cerns about establishing bad precedent.186 
Determining the precise contours of this framework is be-
yond the scope of this Note, as it involves weighing such de-
tailed concerns as industry costs, new technological develop-
ments, privacy concerns, and data transfer logistics well 
beyond those discussed thus far. Nevertheless, a few broad key 
features may be suggested. First, to conform with the narrow 
tailoring requirement, device manufacturers should be able to 
limit the backdoor they provide to a singular, specific device. 
Perhaps this takes the form of custom crafting access based on 
unique identifying information about the device, or perhaps it 
involves law enforcement turning over the device to a manufac-
turer, so that the government never has possession of the back-
door mechanism itself. In either event, it is key that the manu-
facturer be able to maintain limits on the backdoor, as any 
broader use beyond that required to resolve the “clear and pre-
sent danger” of lack of access would go beyond the narrow re-
quirements of the situation. 
Second, it may be useful to base the foundation of this 
framework on that laid out in other electronic search contexts. 
 
 184. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 185. See Krishnadev Calamur, Apple vs. the FBI, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.  
17, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbi-san-
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 186. See id. (laying out both the government’s argument for the need of ac-
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For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act187 re-
quires (under certain circumstances) not only a warrant, but 
also that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed” before the government can intercept certain kinds 
of communications.188 Such a system could go a long way to-
wards limiting usage to only situations where backdoor access 
is strictly necessary, as well as assuaging many of the privacy 
concerns that could arise through attempts to bypass encryp-
tion. 
C. RESPONDING TO COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: WHY A CASE-BY-
CASE BACKDOOR SCHEME MAKES SENSE 
The proposed framework outlined in the proceeding Section 
naturally raises critiques from technology firms, arguing that 
any device access would weaken encryption for all, as well as 
from law enforcement, arguing that the limits described mean 
the proposed framework does not go far enough. This Section 
examines and responds to these critiques. 
1. Even Single-Device Access Would Weaken Device 
Encryption Overall 
From those in favor of strong encryption, a likely response 
to this proposal is that it makes cellphone encryption weaker 
overall.189 This argument is not without merit. As Apple points 
out, “In the wrong hands, this software . . . would have the po-
tential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical posses-
sion.”190 This response suggests, however, two key limitations 
that would substantially reduce the risk of this harm occurring. 
First, the software would have to fall into “the wrong hands.” 
Such access could be minimized by taking the same security 
measures Apple takes for its in-house testing of new software 
and applying it to the backdoor software. Additionally, compa-
nies could store backdoors offline, ensuring that even if a com-
pany is hacked, those hackers will not gain access to the back-
door software.191 Although offline storage does not eliminate the 
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risk of adverse access, it substantially increases the costs, to 
the point of being prohibitive for all but the most powerful of 
actors.192 This would ensure that neither hackers nor even gov-
ernmental actors would be able to gain access to the backdoor 
tools. 
If this risk is still of great concern, however, companies 
could independently develop a backdoor each time it is request-
ed, and then destroy all copies of the backdoor tool after its use. 
Though inefficient, this would ensure that such a tool was nev-
er existent for copying by rogue actors. Perhaps the statutory 
scheme could even factor this in and require the government to 
foot the cost. In this way, there would be no permanent back-
door for anyone to access, rather it would be ephemeral, exist-
ing only for a specific device and only long enough to get the 
needed information off of that device. 
2. Single-Device Access Would Still Permit Many Encrypted 
Files To Remain Outside the Reach of Law Enforcement 
While proponents of strong encryption may worry that 
permitting single device backdoors would weaken security, law 
enforcement may argue that such a system does not go far 
enough. After all, while such a regime would grant access to 
devices made by companies like Apple and Google, it would not 
prevent the use of encryption beyond company control. For ex-
ample, computer users could still download GPG (an open-
source version of the PGP software discussed in Part I.A.2) and 
use encryption not vulnerable to attacks from the privileged 
position device manufacturers enjoy. Law enforcement may ar-
gue that to truly stop encryption from adversely impacting in-
vestigations and security, encryption which cannot be made to 
fit into the framework described above should be made ille-
gal.193 
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The problem with this argument, however, is that a regula-
tion banning encryption would simply be unenforceable.194 Any 
attempt to force open-source software developers to integrate 
encryption backdoors (regardless of whether they be broad or 
narrowly tailored) will simply lead to people who truly want 
government-proof encryption to take the (publically available) 
source code of those tools, remove the backdoor, and proceed as 
they did before. Thus, while making unbreakable encryption il-
legal has intuitive perspective, as a practical matter such a law 
could never be effectively enacted. To borrow a phrase from the 
gun lobby, “when backdoor-proof encryption is outlawed, only 
outlaws will use backdoor-proof encryption.” 
In summary, although broad encryption backdoors meet 
with First Amendment obstacles, law enforcement could use 
multiple other tools that would allow access to a large portion 
of communications without impinging on the First Amendment. 
One such tool would be a narrowly tailored access framework, 
used only in a case-by-case basis. Such a framework would al-
low access to many communications when law enforcement has 
justification, while still addressing security concerns that tech-
nology firms and privacy advocates may raise. 
  CONCLUSION   
As the Internet continues its pervasive growth into every-
day life, encryption is going to be increasingly important, both 
as a tool to ensure privacy and as a hurdle that law enforce-
ment must overcome in their investigations. Although the ac-
cess they may provide has obvious appeal, encryption back-
doors are not a constitutionally acceptable solution to this 
hurdle. For all the aid it may provide, broad encryption back-
doors are not reconcilable with the First Amendment. Such a 
requirement would constitute compelled speech, which is per-
mitted only in the presence of a “clear and present danger,” not 
present in all the cases to which the requirement would apply. 
Despite this apparent problem, this does not leave law en-
forcement bereft of tools to obtain encrypted communication in-
formation. Using other means of information acquisition, law 
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enforcement can still gain access to a wide swath of communi-
cations information. By using tools that either do not require 
any software writing on the part of technology companies, or by 
limiting requests for backdoors to specific individuals, law en-
forcement can gain access to a significant portion of the infor-
mation sought, without crossing the line drawn by the First 
Amendment. 
